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Sundry tools arrived at half-past-ten following urgent calls and they consisted of hoes, muck rakes, and an unidentified tool resembling a pruning fork with a six foot helve. During the night the Commando troop came back from a patrol to the Foresters area with a few prisoners of war and the information that the Battalion had apparently been overrun. Stragglers from the Foresters passed through the area and were told to reform in the DLI area. At one o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, the Carrier Platoon Commander from the DLI reported that his position was untenable and that he had withdrawn his men. The CO ordered him to attempt to retake his position. Shortly after the CO of the DLI placed himself under command.

At half-past eight in the morning, Lieutenant Priestman, the Anti-Tank platoon Commander, reported a party of approximately 70 enemy approaching the Battalion positions along the road from the east about one and a half miles distant. At the same time reports began to roll in from Baker and Dog Companies confirming this. The Commander also reported seeing an infantry gun and a mortar being set up in the area where the troops were first spotted. At nine o'clock a heavy concentration of field artillery and medium gun fire was brought down on the two enemy weapons with good effect.

Half an hour after that, an infantry attack developed on Able Company's position, but fire from 2-inch and 3-inch mortars from concealed positions successfully countered it. Medium machine guns in Able's area also did some very good shooting up the concentration of enemy on the road from the east.

By half-past-ten it appeared that the enemy advance had been checked, and that he had withdrawn to the low ground to the west of Point 221, but artillery continued to shell that area and other likely forming-up places.

All through the rest of the day the Battalion positions were constantly mortared and shelled, gun positions were dive-bombed, and long range machine-gun fire was brought to bear from Point 221 down the railway lines, Attacks developed on each of the Company positions in turn, but they were beaten off, and by midnight the only casualties were one killed and ten wounded.

At two in the morning, after an attack by an enemy patrol had been beaten off by B Company HQ, a two company attack [by the enemy] was put in, and for the rest of the night there was constant small arms and automatic fire from the station area. No report was received from the Company as all communications had broken as the result of shelling and mortaring and the only information gained was from occasional stragglers who gave confused accounts of the fighting.

Shortly after the attack began, Dog Company returned from their positions on the flank and were placed in reserve. Charlie Company were sent forward to cover the gap in the event of Baker being overrun. By five o'clock it was obvious that the enemy were in possession of the village and the station, so when the troop of Churchills (4) came forward from their night lager, a plan was made to use them with one platoon of Charlie Company to clear the northern side of the village whilst the rest of the Company cleared the station area from the south. Some progress was made by 2/nd Lieutenant Bell's platoon on the south side, but when an attempt was made to storm the tunnel under the slag heap at the station end, both the Company Commander, Captain Smith, and the Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Walker, were killed by snipers, and it was found impossible to advance. About the same time the Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Pigot, was sent forward to try and contact Baker Company and he became missing. Stragglers reported that Baker Company and the Anti-Tank Platoon had been overrun.

At half-past six, Charlie Company's left forward platoon, under Captain Thorman, reported that the enemy were holding the village in large numbers, and shortly after that one of the tanks. was knocked out by one of the captured six-pounders.

Captain Thorman's next report came at a quarter to eight, when he informed the CO that owing to machine guns he could not clear the northern side of the village without further troops. He estimated that his platoon had killed some 20 of the enemy, but has sustained 10 casualties. He was ordered to withdraw take command of Charlie Company. A report from Able Company at nine o'clock said that enemy were moving round, to the right flank.

After the Brigade Commander had unsuccessfully attempted to visit the Battalion, an officer was sent for at 10.30 to report on the situation, so at eleven o'clock the CO sent Major Barrell. About this time enemy shells and mortar bombs had caused casualties in the, reserve company area behind Battalion HQ, and several shells were dropped short by the medium gunners, causing 23 casualties in Charlie and HQ Companies. To add to the confusion, two MEs (5) bombed the Battalion area from about 50 feet.

Shortly before one o'clock, Major Barrell returned from Brigade with written instructions from the Brigade Commander giving permission to withdraw after dark, at the discretion of the CO, unless casualties made it imperative to withdraw earlier.

At one o'clock, the CO decided to withdraw under artillery and tank cover in daylight, appreciating that the enemy would attack again in force before dark, and that the attack would come from north, east and south.

During the preparation of orders for withdrawal, Major Barrell evacuated all wounded on carriers below the embankment of the railway and through the river at the rear of the Battalion positions. The wounded were given first aid at a hastily improvised RAP by Cpl Rudkin, the only remaining medically trained NCO in the Battalion. (6)